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Taking Art Personally: Austin, Performatives and Art
  David Goldblatt 
Abstract
This paper is an attempt to apply speech act theory to aesthetics.  In
particular, it purports to be a contribution to reception theory by drawing
attention to certain similarities between the contextual structure of
performatives and the structure of the reception of art.  It hopes to locate the
auditor or spectator of artworks in what J. L. Austin calls “the total context” to
help explain how certain aspects of artworks can be taken personally,
somehow being about and seemingly directed at “me.”  It is one way the so-
called paradox of fiction can be by-passed by showing how the emotive
aspects of artworks are not primarily a matter of our caring about the fictional
characters portrayed therein, but directly about members of the viewing or
listening audience.  Concentrating on the performatives of warnings and
threats, this paper details the writings of Austin to help explain why some
people can relate to characters or situations presented by art while others are
barely moved.
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1.  Introduction
Certain similarities between the contextual structure of performatives and the
structure of the reception of art can help to explain why we take art
personally--why art can seem to be directed at us (more so than some people
we know) and so can help to explain one obvious aspect of the reception of
artworks:  that different people may respond to them differently and with
varying degrees of depth and intensity of emotion.
Without dismissing this well-discussed paradox of fiction or underestimating
the degree to which it intrigues philosophers, performatives are often directly
about the very real viewer or auditor of movies, novels and the like and with
direct impact on existing lives:  their own rather than the fictional characters
contained therein.  As part of a performative’s “total context,” as J. L. Austin
puts it, the viewer is merely egocentric; less concerned with the fictional
characters than with her own personal self to whom the performative seems
to be directed.  For this and more I turn to Austin, his work on speech acts,
emphasizing what he calls its perlocutionary force, acting upon the feelings
and thoughts of its audience.
Taking things personally, as the idiom goes, means something like this:
though they seem to be aimed at something more general, a principle or a
type for example, those “things” seem to be directed at our person in
particular and are usually the instigation of associated identifying feelings. In
my account, artworks, in whole or in part, can be taken personally.  Works
may be experienced by art auditors and spectators as if they were directed at
them.  What happens on the screen or in a novel stays in the novel, but when
it is taken personally it goes beyond the fiction, and the person you care most
about, is you.
Despite its alleged failures, or perhaps because of them, speech act theory
continues to provide opportunities to understand speech as social action:  that
saying something can, at the same time, constitute the completion of an
action.  Thinking of artworks as performatives, arguably the most context
sensitive aspects of meaning, is to imagine works of art as generators of
specific actions, and so to expand both the way we think about art and the
way we think about performatives.
Austin utilizes the terms ‘locutionary,’ ‘illocutionary’ and ‘perlocutionary’ to
help explain how we use the words we use to do different kinds of things. 
Good at raising objections to his own analyses, he knew that his own
distinctions were far from unproblematic, sometimes overlapping and
sometimes vague.  Nevertheless, here in his Lecture IX of How to do Things
with Words, he tries to set them apart as simply as possible.  As I will be
using these distinctions throughout this paper it would be helpful to offer
Austin’s explanations early on:
…[W]e perform a locutionary act,  which is roughly equivalent to
uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense and reference, which
again is roughly equivalent to ‘meaning’ in the traditional sense. 
Second, we said that we also perform illocutionary acts such as
informing, ordering, warning, undertaking, etc., i.e. utterances which
have a certain (conventional) force.  Thirdly, we may also perform
perlocutionary acts:  what we bring about or achieve by saying
something such as convincing, persuading, deterring, or even
surprising or misleading.[1] 
Illocutions are acts performed by using words in appropriate contexts;
perlocutions are acts performed by the consequences of those words. Note
that for Austin, locutions can be true or false, but illocutions can be felicitous
or happy, on the one hand, or infelicitous or unhappy on the other.  Felicity
and infelicity, as we shall see, are tied to the idea of elements of a context. 
My hope is that my own application of these concepts to art will be come
clearer as we move through this essay.  However, it is Austin’s emphasis on
the illocutionary and perlocutionary performative uses in what he calls “the
total context” that is important for the connection between speech acts and
aesthetics, or so I will claim.
2.   Austin, Warnings, and Being about Me (Not You)                          
In his 1958 essay, “Performatives and Constatives,” J. L. Austin draws the
distinction of his title by saying,  “The constative utterance…so dear to
philosophers of statement, has the property of being true or false.  The
performance utterance, by contrast, can never be either:  it has its own
special job, it is used to perform an action.”[2]   Austin has in mind
expressions such as “I promise” or “I apologize” performing the actions of
promising and apologizing by saying those expressions in appropriate
contexts, but it is odd to claim that, for example, “I’m terribly sorry,” cannot
at the same time constitute an apology and be true or false—play constative
and performative at the same time.
Austin was fond of saying of sense-data theorists “there’s the bit where you
say it and the bit where you take it back.”  He does that very thing with his
constative/performative distinction and indeed, came to be his own best critic,
among a large number of others, of the performative thesis itself.  He
“qualifies” his distinction by noting how even stating (making a statement with
an eye toward its truth) is also, like promising, to complete an action by
virtue of speech, and is also subject to certain requirements to make it what
it is.  Nevertheless, Austin helped to bind meaning and action and expanded
the opportunities for philosophers to do things with words.
If we consider some of the typical and most obvious examples of acts
completed in the saying of something, those for which we happen to have
simple names or expressions, such as reminding, greeting, condemning,
welcoming, sentencing, admonishing, accusing, cursing, naming, flirting,
outing and dissing, I will argue that we can find many of these acts, but many
more complex ones, completed in artworks, as well as by utterances.  If I say,
“I don’t like your face,” my words are not merely an expression of my
aesthetic taste, if they are that.  In the proper context, including the
appropriate persons and vocality, those words would constitute a warning
and/or a threat.  However, warnings and perceived threats can also be
achieved by depictions or pictorial acts, even complex or temporally extended
ones, like novels or films, even if the “act” is somewhat elusive (as we shall
see).
      
Trailer for The Battle of Algiers (1965), Gillo Pontecorvo, director
Gillo Pontecorvo’s The Battle of Algiers, for example, banned in France in
1965, the year it was released, was re-released following the 9/11 destruction
of the World Trade Center in New York.  If I say, in 1965, that The Battle of
Algiers is a warning, I would most likely locate the addressees as European
colonialists and those sympathetic to them, in part but not entirely, because
the film is based on real situations.  But since art often asks us to assume a
plurality of subjectivities and at times forces our reception in a number of
subjective locations, we can also be asked to feel what the colonialist feels. 
And further, since the film is also told from the point of view of the
colonialists as well as the terrorists and/or freedom fighters, the film might
threaten two sides simultaneously for a complex and despairing aesthetic
response.  In 2004, the re-release of Algiers may be one indication that the
context for performative enactment is once again in place.  So too, a movie
about amorous infidelity, marital or otherwise, one like Unfaithful, may be
seen as a threat to those who are in the midst of an eroding marriage. 
However, the potential power of art can put us all in the experience of a
marriage gone sour and violated.  And so, for this film and many others, any
aesthetic considerations without an account of its performative function, would
be seriously incomplete.
Crime or horror movies are also warnings, not simply with respect to certain
scenes but to leaving-the-theatre entireties.  They tend to leave their
audiences with feelings of vulnerability by accident or intent simply by being
humanly fragile or by being a citizen of an uncertain world.  Whatever else
they may be, many religious paintings are warnings when they depict an
apocalyptic future.  The Temptation of St. Anthony  and The Last Judgement 
by Hieronymous Bosch are examples of warnings in a religious context. 
Pictorial performatives can be set up to contrast with the usual essentialist
suspects like depiction, representation, or expression.   The tales of the
Brothers Grimm, with children as the directed addressee, can warn in ways
that the simple saying of a moral never can.   However, if I am not religious
or am not a child, each of these works may come across flat, with diminished
potency in comparison with my religious neighbor and the children next door.
In any case, Austin is careful to warn us of the indefinite number of ways a
purported performative would not succeed, or as he puts it quaintly, would be
unhappy or infelicitous.  He says, “I can’t quite bring off the baptism of
penguins.”  Being unhappy or infelicitous might mean that one, some, or all of
the required conditions in which the speaker finds him or herself are not ideal.
Or, it might mean that something the speaker does, such as having an
inappropriate intention or utilizing a variant intonation contour, renders the
“success” of the utterance qua performative “null and void.”
Philosophy is notorious for its emphasis upon “what can go wrong.”  The
variables marking possible infelicities might read like an enormous to-do list
even if it is not possible, in any given circumstance, to provide a complete list
of what Austin calls “the total context.”   But it should be noted, as it is
especially relevant to interpretations in the arts, that intention does not
always play the role it may appear to play.  For example, I may intend to say
certain words, like “I promise to buy you those tickets,” without intending to
buy you those tickets.  Nevertheless, the promise has been made, the act
completed, even if Austin would call the situation “infelicitous.”  Here, words
work on their own without the condition of a sincere promiser.  Of course, I
may not be qualified to make a promise no matter what words I use, if I am
an infant, am coerced, etc.  But in this case, as Austin points out, intention
not to keep a promise would not by itself, mean disqualification. 
We can understand easily why one might be impressed that things ever go
right.  Nevertheless, in practice, they do.  When I say, “One,” to the employee
in the box office at the Regal theatre, the employee at the box office knows
exactly what I mean.  What I am saying, what I mean, cannot be understood
without seeing that I am making a request to which there might be an array
of appropriate responses.  Here I need to imagine that most or all elements of
the “total context” are in place. 
Much of the infamous exchange between Jacques Derrida and John Searle
concerns elements of this “total context,” which Derrida sees as part of  “a
strategy fraught with metaphysical presupposition.”[3]  “Are the conditions of
a context ever absolutely determinable?”[4] he asks.  Henry Staten, writing
on Derrida adds, “At the same time that different occurrences of a sign are
recognizably the same…they are also different because new contexts bring out
new aspects of their meaning possibilities,”[5] and these possibilities cannot
be limited as accidental or inessential.  Therefore, the context is not merely
something like a background for a sign, as it can also transform its meaning,
while somehow retaining traces of previous meanings.  Part of the problem
has to do with being explicit, not whether being explicit can ever meet the
conditions of certainty or decidability, but whether conditions for explicitness
can ever be fully stated.  Further, Derrida objects to Austin’s exclusions of
purported performative expressions as non-serious and questions the
authoritative relationship between addresser and addressee.  Of course,
Austin’s saying baptismal words to penguins is to complete a performative,
just not one of baptism.  Austin might then be making a joke or satirizing. 
Why the religious trumps the frivolous a priori is a question in the spirit of
Derrida’s critique.
As performatives, artworks are subject to some of the same problematic areas
as performative utterances, locutions in the narrow sense of spoken words. 
However, it is often the problematic areas of works of art that initiate the kind
of conversations that keep them alive in a culture.  Many live on their
undecidibility.  For those that are also performatives in some significant way,
it is necessary to think of a total context that includes the roles of audience,
artwork, and artist and the general background, spirit of the times,
conventions, or institutions.  Doing so helps to offer resistance to general
conclusions regarding the meaning of those works and, as elements of the
total context vary, it may aid in directing our attention to personal
circumstances that may not be forceful for everyone.  Clearly, not all
performatives are equally available to artworks, but those that are can
generate a direct impact among the components of felicitous performative
circumstances.
3.  The “Force” of Performatives
In Austin’s 1958 essay, he considers an example of a possible performative
that is not spoken but rather is presumably written and in which a passive
voice is used.  “Passengers are requested to cross the line by the footbridge
only,” something, I suppose, that is a commonplace for the English.   But it is
revealing that Austin casually describes this as an example of an utterance
issued in writing and imagines that somewhere, someone has given his
signature so that the authority of the “I,” the first person form of
paradigmatic performatives, can be maintained through analysis and
reduction.  This Austinian move reveals a Derridian insistence on the
philosophical privileging of speech over writing and the desire for a
metaphysical presence that being present to one’s own speech provides, while
writing offers the possibility of absence (and due to absence, as Socrates
notes in the Phaedrus, vulnerable to misinterpretation).  The over-simplistic,
first person present tense examples of performatives offered by Austin are
likely to lead us to assume a single contextual situation for the completion of
the performative act.  On the other hand, writing opens the possibility of an
abyss between the circumstances of writing and reading (both components of
a total context), just as the display of artworks is typically a doubling of
contextual placement for most viewing and making.  It raises a skeptical but
foundational question about the isolation and protection of museums as ideal
contexts to experience paintings and sculpture.
The idea of a perlocution Austin explains this way:  
Saying something will often produce certain consequential effects upon
the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or
of other persons, and it may be done with design, intention, or purpose
of producing them; and we may then say, thinking of this, that the
speaker has performed an act in the nomenclature of which reference is
made either only obliquely, or even not at all, to the performance of
the locutionary or illocutionary act.  We shall call the performance of an
act of this kind the performance of a perlocutionary act or
perlocution.[6]
One of the points of interest of perlocutions is that the effect they have on
different people varies according to who they are in an inclusive sense of that
phrase.  My sense is that Austin uses the idea of “force” as a measure of
degree, not only between kinds of utterances but also to distinguish the
perlocutionary effects among different persons in different contexts. 
Perhaps more importantly for issues regarding art, Austin uses the
illocutionary and perlocutionary coinages to utilize the notion of the force of
an utterance. “We may be quite clear as to what ‘Shut the door’ means, but
not yet at all clear on the further point as to whether as uttered at a certain
time it was an order, an entreaty, or whatnot.  What we need besides the old
doctrine about meanings is a new doctrine about all the possible forces of
utterances….”[7] For Austin, an utterance having the force it does is a matter
of convention and that it is a matter of convention matters in the
characterization of context.[8]
A force is a kind of transforming impact, and Austin was sensitive to the
obvious idea that the impact of a thank you on the situation of a speaker and
an auditor is considerably different from the impact of a condemnation or an
order, and that the force itself is a matter of degree contingent upon context
even if it is conventional.  Force, then, can differ in strength in the sense that
a suggestion is less forceful than a command.  It seems that Austin uses it to
apply both to utterances and to persons.  A performative changes an
unnamed ship or child into a named one and can turn a single man into a
married one or a base runner into just another out.  Words are sometimes
acts with forces without which an utterance would be missing its conventional
meaning.
Arthur Danto, in his seminal The Transfiguration of the Commonplace,
discusses the transfiguration of the identity of auditors of artworks.  In
discussing Tolstoy’s Anna, Danto says, “…to see oneself as Anna is in some
way to be Anna, and to see one’s life as her life, so as to be changed by
experience of being her… you are what the work is about, a commonplace
person transfigured into an amazing woman.”[9]  This theory of character
identification is something like Danto’s answer to the paradox of fiction.  If
the analogy between artworks and utterances holds, an artwork can be
successful by its power to make the artistic auditor analogous to the
addressee, thus opening the door to an emphasis on reception theory as an
essential candidate for the total context.   However, although performatives
may be generated by fictions, the performative function of the fictional acts,
for example, as real warnings or real threats, may not be. But this is another
and more complex issue.
Writing about acts of “corporeal signification,” those relevant to gender
identification, Judith Butler argues that the gendered body is itself
performative and that its ontological status is inseparable from the acts which
are its reality.  Here, with Butler, rather than words performing acts, we find
acts performing acts, acts as signs acquiring meaning by virtue of
performative forms and forces.  In her book Excitable Speech, Butler, in a
criticism of Pierre Bourdieu says, “I propose to borrow and depart from
Bourdieu’s view of the speech act as a rite of institution to show that there
are invocations of speech that are insurrectionary acts....The force and
meaning of an utterance are not exclusively determined by prior contexts or
‘positions;’ an utterance may gain its force precisely by virtue of the break
with context that it performs.  Such breaks with prior context or, indeed, with
ordinary usage, are crucial to the political operation of the performative. 
Language takes on a non-ordinary meaning in order precisely to contest what
has become sedimented in and as the ordinary.” [10]
Of course, for a speech act to be insurrectionary, as Butler is also aware, it
would need to oppose certain conventions.  So Butler says, in recognition of
this, “…the present context and its apparent ‘break’ with the past are
themselves legible only in terms of the past from which it breaks.  The
present context does, however, elaborate a new context for such speech, a
future context, not yet delineable and, hence, not yet precisely a
context.”[11]  In typical artworld occurrences, works of art rely both upon
conventions and defying conventions, growing out of an accepted art history
and yet bringing something new to the very conventions they violate. 
4.  Road Signs as Performatives
Suppose we consider a certain set of familiar pictures, not artworks, although
one can easily imagine that they would be the subject of artists like Jasper
Johns, since they are clear of form, two dimensional, explicit, conventional,
institutional, and as widely understood as flags or targets.  The United States
Federal Bureau of Motor Vehicles, for example, categorizes certain road signs
as “Warnings.”  Pictorial or semiotic signs that mean “deer crossing” or
“bicycle crossing” or the terse but verbal “Bridge Freezes Before Road” are, I
want to say, performatives, even if they are not speech acts.  Indeed, they
are exemplars of explicit warnings even if the elements of their context for
felicitous performativity is a bit complicated.
 
Unlike a willing bride and groom taking wedding vows, the addressee, the
driver of a vehicle, presumably has taken certain qualifying tests.  The tests
more or less ensure his comprehension of the signs she sees and add to the
credence of the belief that she is properly warned when she approaches a
deer crossing sign at the side of the road.  Of course, the word “presumably”
lets in all kinds of possibilities like illegal or inattentive drivers, drivers who
have forgotten their lessons and the like, but like insincere promising, the
performative completing the warning is clear.  Even if the driver does not
heed the warning, at least in this case, the driver has been warned.  But by
whom?  What isn’t clear is that a single individual has determined the idea for
such a sign or for its appropriate posting.  There are those who would not be
satisfied with saying “the government” or “bureau of traffic control.”  But the
point is that intention can be clear without the intender being clearly
identified.  So the familiar issue of the author is raised.  The placement of a
road sign may be achieved by those having no idea that a warning is being
issued. Is an analogy with the posting of road signs (as opposed to their
production or ideal origination) and the display of artworks, a good one? 
Suppose the deer are hunted down and no longer cross at some approximate
point just up ahead.  Is “Deer Crossing” still a warning?  Or think of “Bridge
Freezes Before Road” losing its intensity under warmer weather conditions,
what Austin calls its perlocutionary force. The driver only sometimes knows
when he is warned and is appropriately uncertain at other times.
5.   Picasso and a Colonialist/Primativist Warning
Consider now one of the more famous paintings of the twentieth century, 
Picasso’s Les Demoiselles d’Avignon of 1907.  This painting is often considered
a major advance for formalism, and formalist analyses of this painting have
been privileged over any contextual account, its content being marginalized or
ignored.
By contrast, Patricia Leighten reminds us of the colonialst/primitivist context
in which Demoiselles was painted, an atmosphere of exotic popular imaginings
of Africa as a pre-civilized Europe, with daily expressions of stereotypical
items and illustrations in the Parisian press.  She says, “Turn-of-the-century
avant-garde artists and their primitivist aesthetic manoeuvrers operated in
and against this world; Pablo Picasso and other modernists could
simultaneously share in and be sharply critical of such colonial attitudes in an
atmosphere we can no longer experience and in a measure we must work to
understand.”  In her article, “Colonialism, l’art nègre, and Demoiselles
d’Avignon,” she writes,  “In Les Demoiselles d’Avignon the Iberian faces of the
two central figures and their crudely simplified forms ally them with Spain’s
prehistoric past and announce Picasso’s origins and preoccupations as outside
(and against) the French classical traditions.  The context of the brothel points
up the prostitutes’ loss of freedom: like slaves they are bought and sold.  At
the same time, the exaggeration of their sexual display threatens the
spectator/customer as they turn their attention from the room to the world
beyond the frame.”[12]
Les Demoiselles d’Avignon, (1907) Pablo Picasso
Form and content come together here in a performative—the painting can be
understood as a double threat:  to the artworld and its audience and to the
citizen of Europe-as-colonialist.  If Leighten is even approximately correct, the
performance of the threat is integral to the meaning of the work; a different
understanding of the elements of the total context makes for different kinds of
illocutionary and perlocutionary forces.  Making the Demoiselles qua threat
more explicit might result in diminishing the power or force of the work as art.
Similarly, we can think of Raphael’s Transfiguration as a unique kind of
farewell or Robert Motherwell’s set of paintings, Elegy for the Spanish
Republic, as acts of memorializing.  Without recognizing the illocutionary
functions of artworks, certain conversations with them (and us) cannot
continue along the route they take and certain perlocutionary effects might
never happen.  Or, in architecture, massive favelas, or shanties,
improvisational and illegally built, are often perceived as threats to the
wealthy neighborhoods they may be near. And, they may actually threaten
even if there is no such intention when favelados make their homes.
6.  Declarations and the Possible Complexity of Speech Acts
As mentioned above, philosophers usually take as paradigm examples of
performatives simple phrases like, “I promise to give you, Smith, five dollars”
(Searle), just as epistemologists tend to find comfort in expressions such as
“The cat is on the mat” or “The book is on the table,” thinking, perhaps with
good reason, that if they cannot deal with the simple cases, what hope have
they of dealing with those more complex.  However, it is not necessary that
an illocutionary act be quick or short even if those are the more usual
examples in the philosophical literature.  The American Declaration of
Independence, for example, of which Derrida has written a critical account,
constitutes acts of declaration and rebellion as it appears in its entirety,
despite the fact that its reception takes more than a few seconds to absorb,
that it is in the fourth person, not the first, contains words that are also
performatives such as promising or threatening, and that the moment of
completion, as with road signs, is unclear.
Frank Stella sees paintings as declarations:  “The idea in being a painter is to
declare an identity.  Not just my identity, an identity for me, but an identity
big enough for everyone to share in.  Isn’t that what it’s all about?”[13]  Here
we can ask of Stella the question regarding authority asked by Derrida of the
signers of the Declaration, “Can one declare for others?”  But is declaring for
others more permissible in art than in politics, assuming the two can be
clearly distinguished?  In any case, the performative aspects of the visual arts
help to emphasize contextual analyses of artworks and forces attention to
what aspects of the performative contexts are lacking when art somehow
goes wrong.  Moreover, artistic performatives may be part of an explanation of
why we take art personally and therefore why we accept one of art’s greatest
gifts.[14]
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